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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT HOLDS INVALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENT FOR LACK OF 
MUTUALITY 
By 
Nathaniel Conti* 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
In Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow, the Arkansas Supreme Court held a contract between 
Alltel Corporation (“Alltel”) and its customers that contained an arbitration provision was 
unenforceable because the contract lacked mutuality.1 The Court reasoned because Alltel 
was the only party that was able to pursue judicial remedies without waiving its rights 
under the contract, there was no mutuality between the parties. As such, the contract 
could not be enforced according to the Court.2 Additionally, while Alltel challenged this 
on the premise that it violated AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion because Arkansas law only 
required mutuality in contracts for arbitration, the Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed, 
noting that mutuality in contracts was a requirement for every contract in Arkansas, not 
merely for arbitration agreements and therefore met the requirements of Concepcion.3 
The Court’s decision in Alltel represents one of the first attempts by a state supreme court 
to distinguish and limit Concepcion in order to provide some protection to consumers. It 
should be noted, however, that the Court failed to consider the United States Supreme 
Court decisions in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co and Prima Paint’s 
progeny of cases in its discussion. Thus, its ultimate holding directly conflicts with 
Prima Paint precedent and must be viewed as a decision that incorrectly limits the 
arbitration process in contradiction of Supreme Court precedent. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
The dispute arose when Peter Rosenow, an Alltel customer, filed a complaint 
against the company for allegedly violating the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.4 
Rosenow additionally alleged the corporation was unjustly enriched by its practice of 
imposing early termination fees on cellular phone customers.5 Rosenow plead the claims 
as part of a class-action suit against Alltel, but the circuit court denied Rosenow’s petition 
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1 Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow, 2014 Ark. 375, 2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, *# (Ark. 2014). 
 
2 Id. at *17. 
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4 Id. at *2. 
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for class certification.6 This decision was appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court who 
reversed and remanded the case back to the circuit court.7 On remand, the circuit court 
then approved of the class certification brought by Rosenow.8 
In response to the approved certification, Alltel moved to exclude any of its 
customers that were currently or had been subject to and bound by an arbitration 
provision within Alltel’s customer contracts.9 Rosenow opposed the motion, and argued 
that Alltel had already waived consideration of the arbitration provision because it failed 
to previously raise the issue.10 After a hearing, the circuit court decided to deny Alltel’s 
motion and the litigation between the two parties continued.11 
Approximately two months  afterwards, Alltel filed a new motion  to compel 
arbitration among any of the class members who were customers of Alltel on or after 
May 1, 2004.12 Alltel claimed that this motion was justified because its “Terms and 
Conditions” agreed to with customers included an arbitration clause that stated all 
disputes between Alltel and the customer would be arbitrated.13 Additionally, Alltel 
claimed that the corporation’s procedures were designed to ensure each customer was 
provided with adequate notice of the corporation’s “Terms and Conditions” including the 
arbitration provision.14 Alltel provided affidavits from employees along with exhibits 
that demonstrated the terms and conditions provided to Alltel customers.15 
In opposition to this new motion, Rosenow first argued that Alltel had waived 
arbitration in the class-action litigation.16 Second, Rosenow argued that Alltel’s motion 
failed to show specific evidence from which it could be inferred that Alltel customers had 
notice and assented to the terms and conditions including the arbitration provision.17 
Third, Rosenow argued that the agreement between Alltel and its customers was invalid 
 
 
 
6 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *2. 
 
7 Id. 
 
8 Id. 
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11 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *2. 
 
12 Id. at *2-3. 
13 Id. at *3. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
 
16  Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *3. 
 
17 Id. at *2. 
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due to a lack of mutuality.18   Finally, Rosenow argued that the terms and conditions of 
the Alltel contract along with the arbitration clause were unconscionable.19 
The circuit court ultimately refused to enforce the motion to compel arbitration 
because it found the agreement lacked mutuality between the parties, a holding not based 
upon the Concepcion decision.20 Alltel then petitioned to the Arkansas Supreme Court to 
reverse the circuit court’s decision to refuse to enforce the arbitration provision.21 
Before the Arkansas Supreme Court, Alltel presented numerous arguments in 
order to overturn the Lower Court’s decision. First, Alltel argued that the contract 
between Alltel and its customers was mutual and unambiguous on its own.22 Alltel 
argued that both parties were bound to arbitrate any disputes and that the agreement did 
not allow for Alltel to pursue a judicial remedy while not allowing a customer to do the 
same.23 Additionally, Alltel argued that the Circuit Court erred by considering parol 
evidence to determine mutuality because the agreement was unambiguous.24 
Furthermore, Alltel contended that even if parol evidence should have been considered, 
the evidence that was considered, whether Alltel sued its customers in 2001 or 2002, was 
not relevant in determining if there was mutuality in the 2004 agreement.25 Alltel 
claimed that this evidence was not relevant specifically because under the agreement both 
Alltel and its customers were permitted to use non-judicial self-help remedies to resolve 
disputes.26 Finally, Alltel claimed that the precedent of Arkansas, which required that an 
arbitration agreement have independent mutuality, should be overturned for violating the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) because Arkansas law did not require independent 
mutuality for other contracts.27 
In opposition to Alltel’s arguments, Rosenow first argued that Alltel had already 
failed to prove the existence of an agreement to arbitrate between the parties.28 
Additionally, Rosenow argued that the terms and conditions of the agreement lacked 
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mutuality “because Alltel's customers can be held liable for outstanding service and 
equipment charges, taxes, fees, and surcharges, as well as Alltel's costs and fees incurred 
to collect unpaid balances, but Alltel's liability cannot exceed a customer's prorated 
monthly recurring service charge, and Alltel is not liable for any incidental, special, or 
punitive damages, or attorney's fees.”29 Rosenow also argued that the agreement lacked 
mutuality because Alltel had previously brought judicial suits against its customers 
without attempting to enforce the arbitration agreement.30 Specifically responding to 
Alltel’s parol evidence arguments, Rosenow asserted that Alltel failed to raise the 
argument at the Lower Court and therefore could not raise the argument before the 
Arkansas Supreme Court and that regardless of this fact, the parol evidence rule did not 
apply to explain course of performance.31 Finally, in response to Alltel’s argument that 
the Court’s precedent violated the FAA, Rosenow argued that the Court had consistently 
held that all contracts, not merely agreements to arbitrate, required mutuality.32 
 
III.       COURT’S ANALYSIS 
 
The Arkansas Supreme Court began its analysis by declaring that it reviewed the 
Lower Court’s decision to deny a motion to compel arbitration de novo.33 The Court 
stated that the threshold question was whether there existed a valid agreement to arbitrate 
between the parties.34 The Court acknowledged that the arbitration provision was subject 
to the FAA, but also stated that it would look to state contract law to determine if the 
agreement to arbitrate was valid.35 The Court, however, also acknowledged that state law 
could apply “to arbitration agreements only to the extent that it applies to contracts in 
general.”36 
In order to determine if the arbitration agreement was valid, the Court noted that 
the rules of construction and interpretation used for regular agreements also applied to 
arbitration agreements.37  Therefore, the Court acknowledged five essential elements that 
 
 
 
 
29 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *7. 
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34 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *9. 
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must be found within the arbitration agreement for it to be valid.38   The Court stated that 
these elements were: “(1) competent parties, (2) subject matter, (3) legal consideration, 
(4) mutual agreement, and (5) mutual obligation.”39   In addition, the Court noted that it 
would, as a matter of law, determine the legal effect and construction of the agreement to 
arbitrate between the parties.40 
When examining the five elements, the Arkansas Supreme Court began with the 
mutuality element. The Court first recognized that the Lower Court determined the 
agreement lacked mutuality and the Arkansas Supreme Court has held arbitration 
agreements lacking mutuality are invalid and unenforceable.41 Therefore, the Court 
stated that they had to determine if the Lower Court properly applied Arkansas law 
regarding mutuality in contracts.42 According to the Court, “mutuality of contract means 
that an obligation must rest on each party to do or permit to be done something in 
consideration of the act or promise of the other; thus, neither party is bound unless both 
are bound.”43 Therefore, any contract that provided only one of the parties an option of 
whether or not to perform would not be considered binding by the Court.44 
The Court then acknowledged according to Alltel there was only one possible 
interpretation to the agreement- both parties were obligated to arbitrate any dispute.45 
And, the Court admitted that upon first glance, Alltel’s argument was persuasive based 
upon an examination of the arbitration provision itself, as it did not contain an express 
reservation for Alltel: 
 
Any dispute arising out of this Agreement or relating to the Services and 
Equipment must be settled by arbitration administered by the American 
Arbitration Association, using the Wireless Industry Arbitration Rules. 
Information regarding this procedure may be found at www.adr.org. Each 
party will bear the cost of preparing and prosecuting its case. We will 
reimburse you for any filing or hearing fees to the extent they exceed what 
your court costs would have been if your claim had been resolved in a 
state court having jurisdiction. The arbitrator has no power or authority to 
alter or modify the [or this] Agreement or any [or these] Terms and 
Conditions, including the foregoing Limitation of Liability section. All 
 
 
38 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *9. 
 
39 Id. 
 
40 Id. 
 
41 Id. 
 
42 Id. at *9-10. 
 
43 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *10. 
 
44 Id. 
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claims must be arbitrated individually, and there will be no consolidation 
or class treatment of any claims. This provision is subject to the Federal 
Arbitration Act.46 
 
The Court noted, however, that prior to the arbitration provision, the terms and conditions 
of the agreement also contained the following provision, “[i]f we do not enforce any right 
or remedy available under this Agreement, that failure is not a waiver.”47    The Court 
stated they previously held that mutuality was lacking in an agreement when one party 
could use the agreement in a certain way, such as electing to pursue or not pursue judicial 
remedies while the other party could not do the same.48 
The Court determined that based upon the above provision, Alltel had clearly 
reserved for itself the power to pursue judicial remedies without suffering the penalty of 
waiver.49 Further, the Court noted that it was clear that Alltel alone held this right 
because the agreement did not provide Alltel’s customers the same rights.50 The Court 
explained that it had held arbitration provisions to be invalid for lack of mutuality when a 
provision within a contract conflicts with the arbitration provision and a court is unable to 
reconcile the two provisions.51 The Court further reasoned that in the instant case, only 
Alltel was able to reject arbitration if it desired, and that it was clear the parties were 
treated differently by the contract.52 Therefore, the Court found the arbitration provision 
to be invalid for lack of mutuality and affirmed the Lower Court’s decision to deny the 
motion to compel arbitration.53 
The Court next examined Alltel’s argument that Arkansas law violated the FAA. 
The Court explained that Alltel believed the precedent violated the FAA because the law 
in Arkansas did not require independent mutuality for any contracts other than arbitration 
agreements, and that such disfavor for arbitration agreements would violate the FAA.54 
 
 
46 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *10-11 (quoting from the disputed arbitration clause). 
 
47 Id at *11. See also Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *11 n. 4 (explaining that the Arkansas 
Supreme Court had in the past, rejected a challenge that it was an error to consider another provision in a 
contract that was outside of the arbitration when determining if an arbitration provision met the mutuality 
requirement necessary to be valid. 
 
48 Id. at *12. 
 
49 Id. 
 
50 Id. 
 
51 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *12-13. 
 
52 Id. at *13. 
 
53 Id. Because the Court affirmed the lower court’s finding of a lack of mutuality, the Court determined that 
they did not need to address Alltel’s parol evidence argument. See Alltel Corp., 2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at 
*13. 
 
54 Id. at *14. 
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The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, disagreed with this position.55 The Court noted 
that the United States Supreme Court has allowed for state law to be applied as long as 
“that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability 
of contracts generally.”56    The Court stated that what it was forbidden from doing was 
invalidating an arbitration agreement based on a state law that applied only to an 
arbitration provision.57 
After determining the appropriate United States Supreme Court precedent, the 
Court distinguished the present case from past Supreme Court cases. The Court 
explained in Casarotto, the Supreme Court held that the FAA supplanted a Montana 
statute because the Montana statute made the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
contingent  upon  "compliance  with  a  special  notice  requirement  not  applicable  to 
contracts generally.”58  The Court determined that this requirement, which was specific to 
arbitration, was in contrast to Arkansas law which applied to every contract.59 
Additionally, the Court distinguished the present case from the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion. The Court noted in Concepcion, the 
Supreme Court considered whether the FAA preempted a California rule of law that held 
“most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”60 The 
Court explained that in Concepcion the Supreme Court found while “unconscionability 
was a generally applicable contract defense that could invalidate an arbitration 
agreement, California's rule of law ‘[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration 
interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme 
inconsistent with the FAA.’”61   In contrast, the approach taken in Arkansas, as explained 
by the Court, was to examine the agreement for mutuality and this was valid because it 
was the same approach that would be taken with any contract made within the state 
regardless of whether it involved arbitration.62 
Furthermore, the Court noted that to further both the fundamental policy in favor 
of arbitration, and the principle that arbitration is a matter of contract, the Court “must 
place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts.”63   Thus, the Court 
 
 
55 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at 14. 
 
56 Id. (quoting Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-687 (1996)). 
 
57 Id. at *15, quoting Casarotto at 686-687. 
 
58 Id., quoting Casarotto at 687. 
 
59 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *15. 
 
60 Id. at *16, quoting AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 at 1746 (2011). 
 
61 Id., quoting Concepcion at 1748. 
 
62 Id. 
 
63 Id. at*16, quoting Concepcion at 1748 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67, (2010)) and (citing Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, (2006)). 
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reasoned that it would run afoul of its mandate from the Supreme Court by failing to 
consider mutuality or other contract principles when determining if a valid arbitration 
agreement existed because it would be treating an agreement to arbitrate differently from 
other contracts.64    Refusing to take this stance, the Court rejected Alltel’s argument.65 
Last, the Court declined to address Alltel’s argument that the Lower Court erred by 
failing to enforce the arbitration provision, and also declined to address Rosenow’s 
arguments that were no longer necessary because it accepted the Lower Court’s 
determination that the agreement lacked mutuality.66 
 
IV.       SIGNIFICANCE 
 
Alltel Corp v. Rosenow is significant as it represents one of the first attempts by a 
state supreme court to push back against and distinguish the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.67    It is clear that in at least some 
states, courts may attempt to depart from Concepcion in an attempt to protect consumers 
who enter into unilateral arbitration agreements; courts will either apply the doctrine of 
mutuality, as was the case here, or require that a judicial waiver be unambiguous in an 
arbitration provision, as did another court in New Jersey.68   Should other courts attempt 
to take a similar path as the Arkansas Supreme Court did in this case, then the court will 
have to ensure the compliance of the requirements of Concepcion, that state law must be 
applied to arbitration agreements as it would generally be applied to all other contracts.69 
So long as this requirement is met, courts should be able to invalidate an arbitration 
provision finding that it runs afoul of state contract law. 
Additionally, for practitioners and parties who have agreed to arbitration in 
Arkansas, Alltel Corp will likely result in increased litigation of agreements to arbitrate. 
Many arbitration agreements will now likely be challenged for lack of mutuality, 
particularly those arbitration agreements that are similar to the one found in this case. As 
 
 
64 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *16-17. 
 
65 Id. at *17. 
 
66 Id. at *18. 
 
67 The New Jersey Supreme Court has also recently attempted to distinguish a case from AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion in Atalese v. United States Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 99 A.3d 306 (2014). In that case, the 
plaintiff contracted for debt adjustment services with the defendant. Within the contract was an arbitration 
provision that stated that any disputes would be arbitrated. But, the provision according to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court did not unambiguously and clearly communicate to the plaintiff that she was waiving her 
rights to a trial and thus, the arbitration provision was unenforceable. The New Jersey Court stated that this 
did not violate Concepcion because New Jersey law held that any contractual provision, not just arbitration 
provision, must be clear and unambiguous when a party waives a statutory or constitutional right such as the 
right to pursue a judicial remedy. 
 
68 See Atalese v. United States Legal Servs. Grp. L.P., 99 A.3d 306. 
 
69 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *16. 
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such, merchants who enter into such agreements with consumers in Arkansas must 
consider revision of their arbitration agreements to prevent litigation resulting from a lack 
of mutuality in those agreements. Finally, this case along with the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s decision in Atalese reflect the fact that the United States Supreme Court may 
eventually be forced to clarify its decision in Concepcion by further defining what state 
law contract rules can or cannot be preempted by FAA §2. Such a decision may explore 
whether requirements such as mutuality have a disproportionate impact upon arbitration 
agreements and would therefore possibly be invalid under the FAA. 
 
V. CRITIQUE 
 
While the Arkansas Supreme Court focuses upon Arkansas precedent regarding 
mutuality in arbitration agreements and Arkansas state contract law, the Court’s analysis 
of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion is curious.  Throughout this decision, the Court clearly 
attempts to sidestep the holding of Concepcion, which held the FAA preempts state law 
that treats arbitration agreements differently from other contracts.70 To better conceal its 
attempts to sidestep Concepcion, the Arkansas Supreme Court was careful to follow the 
analysis of arbitration agreements under the laws of its state that Concepcion did not find 
impermissible. The Court specifically claimed that it had not treated arbitration 
agreements differently from other contracts in Arkansas, but merely applied the same 
rules to arbitration agreements as it did to other contracts.71 Through this statement, the 
Court appears to imply that the application of Arkansas law concerning mutuality does 
not lead to arbitration agreements being disproportionately affected.72 By framing its 
analysis in this manner, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision provides Arkansas 
consumers with some protection from unilateral arbitration agreements, while loosely 
following the letter of the law enunciated in Concepcion.73 
Additionally, the Court distinguished the facts of the present case from the prior 
United States Supreme Court cases where it was clear that the governing analysis of the 
arbitration agreements or the rules regulating arbitration agreements were structured in a 
way that resulted in arbitration being treated differently from other contracts within the 
state.74 By doing so, the Arkansas Supreme Court may have provided a way forward for 
limiting the holding in Concepcion, and reinsulate consumers from unilateral arbitration. 
 
 
 
70 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 
71 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *14. 
 
72 See Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *15. 
 
73 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1440 at 1748.. 
 
74 Compare Alltel Corp. (Mutuality is a requirement for all contracts in Arkansas, not just arbitration 
provisions) with Concepcion (Arbitration provision is unconscionable because it cannot be shown that 
bilateral arbitration is a substitute for class action lawsuits) and Casaratto (Contracts with arbitration 
provisions must provide such notice through the use of underlined capital letters on the first page in roder 
to be enforceable). 
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So long as state courts ensure that they, like the Arkansas Supreme Court here, merely 
apply state law to an arbitration provision as they would any other contract and ensure 
that it does not apply disproportionately to arbitration agreements, then it is entirely 
permissible under Conception to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement that fails to 
follow state law. 
If this was all that was required by the Supreme Court, then the decision here 
would be entirely commendable. But, both the parties and the Court seem to have 
inexplicably failed to mention or discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. In Prima Paint, the Supreme Court held courts that 
consider a request to stay a judicial proceeding to allow for arbitration must consider 
“only issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.”75 The 
Supreme Court would, in a later case, hold Prima Paint to mean that “as a matter of 
substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the 
remainder of the contract.”76 Additionally, the Supreme Court has made clear that Prima 
Paint applies in state courts as well as federal courts, and that “unless the challenge is to 
the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract's validity is considered by the 
arbitrator in the first instance.”77 
Resultantly, an arbitration provision is severable from the rest of the contract and 
because Prima Paint explicitly applies to state courts, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
should have severed the arbitration provision from the rest of the contract between Alltel 
and its customers.78 The provision that allegedly lacked mutuality was present in a prior 
(date) consumer agreement. Yet, the Arkansas Supreme Court found that the consumer 
agreement between Rosenow and Alltel, one made at a later date, was unenforceable 
because of the lack of mutuality in the prior agreement.  Arguably, the old agreement 
should have been severed for a lack of mutuality. The new and independently written 
arbitration agreement should have been preserved as the agreement, by requiring both 
parties to arbitrate any dispute as mandated by the FAA, had mutuality.79 
While severability is often invoked in instances where the rest of the contract is 
deficient and one of the parties still wishes to enforce the arbitration clause, there is no 
indication that this is a requirement under Prima Paint or its progeny even if it is 
generally the most likely reason for severability. Arbitration clauses can be severed so 
that a court can resolve challenges made specifically to arbitration clauses rather to entire 
contracts. In the event an arbitration clause is specifically challenged, a court may 
adjudicate the challenge.80   But, if the challenge is to the contract and not specifically to 
 
 
75 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 
76 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006). 
 
77 Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. 440 at 446. 
 
78 See generally, Alltel Corp., 2014 Ark. LEXIS 492 (failing to sever the arbitration provision that the court 
held unenforceable). 
 
79 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *10-11. 
 
80 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-446 (2006). 
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the arbitration clause, a court must enforce arbitration and allow the arbitrator to first 
adjudicate the dispute.81 In this case, Rosenow did not challenge only the arbitration 
clause, but also challenged the additional language from a different provision within the 
contract.82  Because it was not a challenge solely to the arbitration clause, but instead was 
a challenge to the arbitration clause along with another provision of the contract, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court should have simply severed the impermissible language to 
preserve the arbitration clause.83 Because the Court failed to do so, the decision in Alltel 
Corp. must be viewed as a decision that stands in direct conflict with controlling US 
Supreme Court precedent. 
 
 
VI.       CONCLUSION 
 
The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision makes clear that state supreme courts 
will attempt to push back and limit the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Concepcion in order to protect consumers and traditional state contract  laws. 
Additionally, the Court may have provided other states with a way forward in any 
potential attempt to limit Concepcion by requiring that any arbitration provision meet 
mutuality requirements that are required in all state contracts in Arkansas. But, future 
courts should be wary to not repeat the mistake that the Arkansas Supreme Court made 
here by failing to consider Prima Paint and it’s progeny of cases. It is conclusively 
settled that arbitration provisions are as a matter of federal law, severable from the rest of 
a contract. As such, any attempt to limit Concepcion through the requirement of 
mutuality or other similar means, must be done through consideration of only the 
arbitration provision and not the entire contract. Doing otherwise should only lead a 
court toward a rebuke from the United States Supreme Court for failing to follow Prima 
Paint and will not succeed in the goal of limiting Concepcion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. 440 at 446. 
 
82 Alltel Corp.¸2014 Ark. LEXIS 492, at *11-12. 
 
83 See Prima Paint 388 U.S. 395; Buckeye Check Cashing 546 U.S. 440. 
